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This dissertation is an investigation into how scientific values may influence the kinds of theories 
which are investigated, and in turn which theories become ‘mainstream’. I have focussed on 
psychedelic therapy as a family of theories, and I identified three main reasons as to why 
psychedelic therapy is somewhat incompatible with the current psychiatric paradigm: (1) the 
inability to conduct double-blind trials, (2) The inability to isolate one explanatory variable, and (3) 
The mystical and spiritual dimensions of the mechanisms of action of psychedelic drugs. Because 
double-blind randomised controlled trials, isolating one explanatory variable, and neurobiological-
style explanations of mechanisms of action are seen as an integral part of good psychiatric research, 
this means that psychedelic therapy is inherently disadvantaged as a research avenue in the current 
paradigm. These three things also arguably embody scientific values proposed by Kuhn (1977), 
such as accuracy, simplicity, and consistency. Helen Longino (1995) argues that Kuhn’s values do 
not simply increase the likelihood of a theory being true, but in some instances serve to perpetuate 
discriminatory ideologies. She proposes her own list of values as a route to a more equitable 
science, and by extension, a more equitable society. Interestingly, psychedelic therapy as a theory 
embodies many, if not all of the values proposed by Longino. This led me to my conclusion that if 
the psychiatric paradigm were more feminist according to Longino’s criteria, then psychedelic 
therapy would be considered a “better” theory. It would therefore be easier to conduct research in 
this area, and psychedelic therapy would have a better chance at becoming a mainstream treatment.  
 4
 The scientific method is a way of investigating the truth of scientific theories by testing 
hypotheses through mathematics, experimentation, and observation (“Scientific Method”, 2020). 
Because the scientific method is the cornerstone of our contemporary knowledge-generating 
enterprises, the idea that the scientific method and its outcomes could be influenced by scientists 
and socio-political factors is unsettling to say the least. Feminist philosophers of science such as 
Longino (1990; 1995) and Kourany (2003) lament that all too often, science and its methods play a 
role in the subjugation of marginalised groups, and that the methodology and values upon which 
science is based can serve to further perpetuate inequality. I wish to say that the ways in which the 
values of contemporary science contribute to the exacerbation of such inequalities also serve to 
limit the kinds of theories which are acceptable to us. This in turn hinders the exploration of 
potentially fruitful avenues of research. I argue that by promoting theories which embody feminist 
values, as proposed by Longino (1995), we would also create a framework in which alternative 
solutions are given parity. The ‘alternative solutions’ which I will focus on in this paper will be the 
use of psychedelic drugs to treat mental illness.  
 I am aware that the topic of psychedelic drugs is controversial, not least because of their 
illegal status. However this dissertation is not meant to be a persuasive essay on why we should 
conduct research into psychedelic therapy, or whether it is safe or ethical. Texts such as “The 
Therapeutic Potential of Psychedelic Drugs: Past, present, and future” (Carhart-Harris & Goodwin, 
2017), “Psychedelics not linked to mental health problems or suicidal behavior: A population study” 
(Johansen & Krebs, 2015), “Taking Psychedelics Seriously” (Byock, 2018), and “How to Change 
Your Mind: The new science of psychedelics” (Pollan, 2018) outline the promising findings and 
risk levels associated with psychedelic therapy, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of 
this essay. This dissertation is not an endorsement of the recreational use of psychedelic drugs, and I 
do not wish to argue that psychedelic therapy should be mainstream, rather I wish to highlight the 
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ways in which experimental exploration of this avenue is hindered by current paradigmatic 
scientific values.  
 Psychedelic therapy is a promising area of psychiatric research (e.g. Carhart-Harris & 
Goodwin, 2017; Schenberg, 2018; Tupper, Wood, Yensen, & Johnson, 2015...). Clinical trials 
investigating lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), psilocybin (the active ingredient in ‘magic’ 
mushrooms), and dimethyltryptamine (DMT) have produced significant results which suggest them 
to be effective in treating many psychological disorders with relatively few associated risks 
(Bogenschutz et al., 2015; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016a,b; Gasser et al., 2014; Griffiths et al., 2016; 
Grob et al., 2011; Ross et al., 2016). Although ‘psychedelic therapy’ is not in itself a theory, it can 
be thought of broadly as a family of theories which centrally involve the idea that psychedelic drugs 
(concurrent with “set”, “setting”, and psychotherapy) can be used to treat mental illness and 
improve well-being. For simplicity’s sake, I will use the term ‘psychedelic therapy’ to refer to this 
family of theories. 
 Despite these promising initial findings, it seems as if our current psychiatric paradigm and 
its methodologies make it unduly difficult to conduct psychedelic therapy research in several ways. 
In this paper I will discuss how the restrictive aspects of experimental psychiatry somewhat reflect 
the scientific values proposed by Kuhn (1977). The crux of my argument is based on Longino’s 
(1995) response to Kuhn, in which she argues that his values contribute to the perpetuation of a 
sexist society. In turn she proposes a set of alternative feminist scientific values. My thesis is that 
although Longino has proposed these values as a route to a more equitable science and society, 
prioritising theories which embody these values would also make it easier to investigate psychedelic 
therapy, and therefore make it easier for it to become a mainstream treatment.  
 6
Paradigms, Values, and Theory Choice  
Paradigms   
 Kuhn (1962) argues that all scientific activities take place within a paradigm. Kuhn’s use of 
the term ‘paradigm’ varies throughout his writing (Masterman, 1970), however in this dissertation 
the term ‘paradigm’ can be thought of in the following way: a conceptual framework which 
facilitate ‘normal’ science, consisting of a set of theoretical beliefs, rules, values, instruments, 
measuring techniques, and metaphysics (among other things), which are characterised by an 
exemplar theory (Holcomb, 1989; Wray, 2011). An exemplar is a widely agreed upon solution to a 
concrete problem which acts as a guide in solving other related problems, e.g. Kepler’s 
mathematical model which describes the orbit of Mars. Kepler was the first astronomer to describe 
planetary orbits as ellipses rather than circles (Koot, 2014). This theory is an exemplar since it 
provides a guide for solving related problems; it provides certain constraints which make it easier to 
construct these models, had the solution not been available as a guide (Wray, 2011).   
 A scientific paradigm not only dictates how we go about solving scientific ‘puzzles’ (or 
problems), but also which kinds of puzzles we should be investigating . During ‘normal science’, 
scientists do not attempt to disprove or confirm the bases of the paradigm, and data which is 
anomalous with the paradigm is ignored or simply explained away. A build-up of anomalous data 
can result in a scientific “crisis”, where the most fundamental presuppositions of the paradigm are 
called into question. Such a crisis could motivate a paradigm shift, which is, according to Kuhn, 
characteristic of a scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1962). In this paper, I will discuss certain things 
which I take to be paradigmatic of contemporary experimental psychiatry: double-blind 
randomised-controlled trials (DB-RCTs), isolating a single explanatory variable, and reductive 
neurobiological-style explanations of mechanisms of drug action. I argue that these things are 
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paradigmatic since they are largely unquestioned, taken as standard, and they provide the basis for 
psychiatric drug-testing methodologies. Scientists in this field are jointly committed to both their 
use and validity to such an extent that they dictate the kind of puzzles which are amenable to being 
investigated by experimental psychiatry.    
  
Values  
 As pointed out in the above section, values form part of a paradigm. Hendy (2018) notes 
that scientific practice is not a value-free, or politically neutral territory. Rather, scientific activities 
are an important site of negotiations over both values and politics. It seems that it is possible to 
draw a de jure/de facto distinction, whereby the prescribed methodology dictates how science ought 
to go in an ideal world where no scientist is influenced by values or context, and scientific practice 
is how things actually go, given the idiosyncrasies of scientists and contexts in which science takes 
place. Even if the methodologies of science are based on theoretically objective principles, the 
actual workings of science are never value-free or without political contestation.   
 Thomas Kuhn (1977) proposed a list of values which, he believes, in their varying 
combinations form the basis of good scientific theories. These criteria should guide choices between 
two competing theories. He points out that there is no objective combination of his values which 
will help us to pick the right theory every time, in fact some of the values contradict each other. 
Scientists must choose to  prioritise certain values based on the nature of the research, their own 
personal ideas, biology, personality, or life experience. Longino (1995) argues that Kuhn's values 
guise themselves as purely epistemic values which increase the likelihood of the theory being true. 
She argues, however, that they also serve social or political interests. Longino believes that it is not 
so simple to clearly separate epistemic values from cultural and socio-political values, and endorses 
what she calls ‘contextual empiricism’; the view that while experiment and observation is the most 
legitimate way of validating knowledge, the relevance of certain aspects of this method to 
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hypotheses is mediated by “background assumptions which operate on many levels” (Longino, 
1995, p.384). It is not clear that epistemic and contextual factors are mutually exclusive, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that a value could be concerned with rational justification and the 
probability of truth, while at the same time being influenced by socio-political factors. What 
Longino argues is that we should be wary of any value which advertises itself as purely epistemic, 
since the influence of culture, politics, and society is so deeply rooted and often hard to detect.  
The Role of Values in What Constitutes a “Good” Scientific Theory 
 In this coming  section, I will introduce Kuhn’s (1977) values. I will then discuss Longino’s 
(1995) objection to these values, and then introduce Longino’s proposed alternative value. Longino 
does not have an objection to every value proposed by Kuhn, and some of them contrast each other 
more obviously than others, however for simplicity, I have chosen to present them in this way:   
1) Kuhn claims that a theory should be accurate in that the consequences that one might deduce 
from a theory should agree with experimental data and observations. Longino argues that even 
this value has socio-political consequences, since it involves a judgement of which data your 
theory should be in agreement with. Instead, she proposes empirical adequacy. The claims of 
theories which are empirically adequate will agree with past, present, retrospective and 
predictive data. 
2) Kuhn says a theory should be consistent, such that it does not contradict itself or other well-
established theories. Longino responds that by valuing consistency we serve to perpetuate 
standard values and practice. She proposes that we should instead value novelty. In order for 
equality to emerge in a society in which discrimination is at play, it is necessary to develop 
theories which differ from those which have helped to create or exacerbate such inequalities e.g. 
in the early 19th century, race began to be conceptualised in biological terms; head size and 
shape was considered to be linked to intelligence and civility, and differences in head sizes 
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between white and black people was used as a ‘scientific’ basis for racial discrimination 
(Anderson & Perrin, 2009). The development of a (more) egalitarian society relied on theories 
which were not consistent with such established ‘scientific’ theories. Only a theory which 
challenged head-measuring theories would be able to elicit social change, and dictating that 
‘good’ theories are the ones which are consistent with head measuring theories only serves to 
strengthen racist ideologies.   
3) Kuhn argues that a theory should have a broad scope in that the consequences of the theory 
extend far beyond what it was designed to explain. Longino roughly contrasts this to her value 
of complexity of interaction (which may also be contrasted to Kuhn’s value of ‘simplicity’). 
Longino points out that there may not always be one ‘main’ factor, and mechanisms of action 
may be such that all the factors influence one another. Complexity of interaction prioritises 
theories which treat interactions between entities as mutual and dynamic, rather than as 
unidirectional processes. Longino critiques the experimental practice of ‘context stripping’ - a 
term borrowed from Ruth Hubbard (1988) -  arguing that if we detach some factor from the 
context in which it occurs in the natural world, then we will fail to see how the factors in that 
context affect its operation. Complexity of interaction is characteristically feminist, because in 
models and theories where there is one ‘main’ factor, this makes all other factors in the theory 
passive objects rather than active agents. Longino refers to an example of accounts of the role 
of the female gamete in fertilisation. In such accounts, the egg is seen as passive, and dormant. 
The sperm makes a perilous journey to the egg where, by the strength of the tail, he burrows 
into the egg and causes fertilisation. In such an account, the role of the egg is described as 
delicately ‘feminine’, and the sperm as bravely ‘masculine’ (Martin, 1991), even though 
research has shown that the sperm and the egg are mutually active partners in the fertilisation 
process (Schatten & Schatten, 1983). Longino claims that such asymmetry of agency in 
accounts of physiological processes manifests itself as asymmetry in social processes, and by 
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prioritising complex models of social interaction, this in turn reveals the role of women in the 
structure of social institutions.  
4) Kuhn argues that a theory should be simple, meaning that it unifies or makes sense of a set of 
phenomena that were previously isolated, or confused. Longino points out that simplicity helps 
to perpetuate inequalities, since such theories are supported partially by the intolerance of 
differences. Simple theories would dictate that different types are ranked, one type chosen as 
standard, and all others would be viewed as failed or incomplete versions. This erasure of 
differences can have serious implications for the interpretation of data. Longino uses an 
example from economics, where the ‘head of the household’ is seen as the main economic actor, 
where the interests of all of the other members of the household are indistinguishable from 
those of the head. By ignoring the agency of the other family members, such economic theories 
scaffold and support an oppressive family structure where one person makes the decisions. To 
treat simplicity as a theoretical virtue incorporates its socio-political implications into the 
justificatory process of science. Longino says we should instead value ontological 
heterogeneity. According to this value, a theory should grant parity to other entities, where 
different kinds of entities can be causally efficacious, or a paradigmatic member of that domain, 
without attempts to reduce the entities to one basic kind. Such a value is feminist in that it 
would give parity to the role of women in explanatory models.    
5) According to Kuhn, a theory should be fruitful in that it enlightens us to new phenomena, or to 
previously unnoted relationships between known phenomena. Longino argues that this value is 
conservative, since it focuses on the theory, and not the applicability of the theory. Longino puts 
forward two new values which roughly contrast the value of fruitfulness. The first is 
‘applicability to current human needs’ - priority should be given to theories which generate 
knowledge to improve the human condition, or at least to alleviate some of its suffering. The 
second is ‘diffusion of power’, which gives preference to theories which do not require 
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expensive equipment, or needlessly complex levels of expertise, or other things which act as 
non-essential barriers to participation.    
 Longino argues that Kuhn’s values are mainstream precisely because they reinforce the 
contemporary socio-political context of science. Since values are a part of the scientific paradigm, 
and partially dictate which kinds of phenomena are investigated, and how they are investigated, the 
roles of values in science is undeniably important. Because science is so intertwined with context, 
Longino argues that changes in science will result in changes of context. Kuhn’s values reinforce a 
discriminatory socio-political context, and therefore a departure from the prioritisation of these 
values is necessary for equality to emerge. Crucially for my thesis, Longino also notes that the 
values that she proposes do not have fixed socio-political meanings, and that they may be relevant 
to projects other than feminism.    
 Psychedelic Therapy  
 Plant-based psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin and ayahuasca have a long history of 
indigenous medicinal use(Carhart-Harris & Goodwin, 2017; Sloshower, 2018). They are drugs 
which essentially perturb processes which normally constrain the neural systems central to 
perception, cognition, emotion, and sense of self (Swanson, 2018). Psychedelic ‘trips’ are 
characterised by experiencing colour, texture, contours, light and sound intensity, and timbre 
variation more intensely. The external world seems rendered in high definition, and is accompanied 
by a sense of ‘clarity’, ‘freshness’, and ‘connectedness’ with the environment, and a sense of being 
refreshed or renewed (ibid). The psychedelic experience is notoriously difficult to put into words 
(Pollan, 2018). In terms of a more neuroscientific description, psychedelics are “compounds with 
appreciable serotonin 2A receptor agonist properties that can alter consciousness in a marked and 
novel way” (Carthart-Harris & Goodwin, 2017, p.2105), where LSD is a ‘prototypical’ psychedelic.    
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 After LSD was discovered in 1943 (Hoffman & Ott, 1980), there was a relatively brief 
amount of time where the therapeutic potential of these drugs was investigated experimentally 
(Dyck, 2005). By 1965 there had been over a thousand research papers written on the uses of 
psychedelic drugs, and the experiences they occasioned their user, with over forty thousand research 
subjects having been involved (Grinspoon, 1981). From the mid-1960s it became increasingly 
difficult to do scientific research due to government restrictions on psychedelic drugs, and changes 
in experimental standards (Oram, 2014). However as the general population embraced the use of 
psychedelics ‘recreationally’, they became a huge source of societal influence (Carhart-Harris & 
Goodwin, 2017; Grinspoon & Bakalar, 1979; Lee and Shlain, 1992; Stevens, 1987). Psychedelics 
came to be associated with ‘hippies’, left wing politics, pacifism, and the free love movement of the 
1960s (Jarnow, 2016). 
 After around a 25-year hiatus, research began again in the 1990s (Cooper, 2012). Since then, 
there has been research which suggests that psychedelics are safe and tolerable in treating obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Moreno et. al, 2006), end of life psychological distress (Gasser et al., 2014; 
Griffiths et al., 2016; Grob et al., 2011; Ross et al., 2016), alcoholism (Bogenschutz et al, 2015), 
tobacco addiction (Johnson et al., 2014) and major depressive disorder (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016a, 
b). There have been no reported prolonged cases of psychosis or perception disorder in modern 
trials with psychedelics (Rucker, Iliff, & Nutt, 2017). 
 Psychedelic treatment sessions in a clinical setting tend to occur like this: preparation 
sessions facilitate trust and rapport between the participant and the therapist, as well as giving the 
participant guidance to facilitate the ‘best’ psychedelic experience. The session itself takes place in 
a welcoming and comfortable environment with dim lighting, eye-shades, and relaxing and 
emotionally-directing music. A study Kaelen et al. (2018) observed the influential role of music in 
psychedelic therapy sessions, in how it influenced the psychedelic experience. Empathic support is 
provided by two trained therapists, who are present at all times during the session. After the session 
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with the psychedelic drug, an integrative session occurs where the participant recounts and makes 
sense of their experience (Roseman, Nutt, & Carhart-Harris, 2018; Schenberg, 2018). It is worth 
noting that therapeutic support is an essential component of treatment, and that without it, there may 
be few positive effects, or even negative effects (Oram, 2014). 
 It seems that there are (at least) three main difficulties with integrating psychedelic therapy 
into our current psychiatric paradigm. The first is the extreme difficulty in conducting DB-RCTs 
(Doblin, 2001; Hendy, 2018; Pollan, 2018). The second is the inability to isolate one clear 
explanatory variable (Doblin, 2001; Sloshower, 2018), and the third is the mystical and spiritual 
dimensions of psychedelic drugs’ mechanisms of action (Corbin, 2010; Pollan, 2018; Sloshower, 
2018). Since DB-RCTs, isolating a single explanatory variable, and reductive neurobiological-style 
explanations are arguably paradigmatic of experimental psychiatry, the fact that psychedelic therapy 
may be incompatible with them has serious implications for the progress of research. 
 The Role of the Law 
 Psychedelic drugs are considered to be Class A in the United Kingdom (UK), and Schedule I 
in the United States of America (US). These classifications are given to drugs which have a high 
potential for abuse, have no currently accepted medical use, and are not safe to use, even under 
medical supervision (Nutt, King, & Nichols, 2013). Nutt et al. argue that the classification of 
psychedelics in this way occurred not because of the harmful effects of these drugs, but because of 
historical accident, and the assumption that there were no medical benefits for such drugs. They 
argue that decisions regarding the classification of drugs are inconsistent, and may have been made 
for political rather than health-related reasons. This may also be due to the fact that decisions about 
the drugs’ safety or lack thereof were made before modern scientific methods allowed a proper 
understanding of their pharmacology and toxicology. Nutt et al. also note that once a drug has been 
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classified as Schedule I, it is extremely unlikely that any medical use will be found, since it 
becomes so difficult to do research with said drug (Strassman, 1991).  
 In order to facilitate research, it seems that legalisation, or at least decriminalisation is a 
necessary step (Marks, 2019). In order for this to occur in the US, Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approval is necessary (“Unapproved Drugs”, 2020). In the essay, I refer more often to FDA 
procedure, firstly because the US is responsible for the development of 42% of new chemical 
entities (Keyhani et al., 2010), and secondly, because there is simply for information available on 
FDA procedures. In the coming section I will discuss current criteria a drug must meet in order to 
be approved by the FDA. 
Paradigm Incompatibility and its Implications for Research 
 Psychedelic therapy is in several ways incompatible with the paradigmatic experimental 
tools which are used to determine the efficacy of a drug. Psychedelic researchers are tasked with 
making their research experiments fit in with the current psychiatric paradigm. This may be 
impossible, have serious implications for how effective psychedelics are perceived to be by the 
scientific community, and also erase important aspects of psychedelic therapy, especially as it is 
used indigenously (Sloshower, 2018). Hendy (2018) argues that these methodological negotiations 
are a key site for looking at the struggle of psychedelic therapy to be perceived as credible, and are 
crucial in looking at the politics surrounding psychedelic research.  For various reasons (a 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation), the following methods have become 
some of the core standards which indicate the efficacy and legitimacy of psychiatric drugs. 
 Double-Blind Trials 
 Double-blind trials are clinical trials where both the patient and the experimenters are 
unaware of whether the participant has received the active test drug or the placebo (Doblin, 2001). 
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The double-blind trial is considered to be a ‘gold-standard’ of medical research, since it decreases 
the likelihood of biased observations of how effective the treatment outcomes are (“Placebos and 
Blinding in Randomized Controlled Cancer Clinical Trials for Drug and Biological Products 
Guidance for Industry”, 2019). Since the Thalidomide crisis, where babies were born with physical 
deformities after their mothers took thalidomide for morning sickness, the FDA became much 
stricter on the requirements that a drug must meet in order to be approved (Corbin, 2010). The FDA 
requires that drugs seeking approval should show efficacy in at least two DB-RCTs (Hendy, 2018; 
“Adequate and Well Controlled Studies”, 2019; Doblin, 2001). Observation of  efficacy in DB-
RCTs is also required by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency in the UK 
(Rucker et al., 2017).  
 DB-RCTs are a valuable tool for clinical research, however they pose something of a 
problem for psychedelic research. Doblin (2001) notes that practically speaking, due to the 
profound and dramatic effects of psychedelic drugs, it is incredibly difficult to blind the subject and 
the researcher to the treatment condition, a sentiment which has been noted by several other 
researchers in the psychedelic field (Hoffer, 1967; Kast, 1970). Griffiths, Richards, McCann, and 
Jesse (2006) found that researchers correctly guessed the treatment condition 77% of the time. In 
other words, because the majority of the time both the experimenter and the participant are aware of 
the treatment condition, the trial is not therefore blinded. This makes it is extremely, or even 
impossible for psychedelic research to meet the DB-RCT standards set out by the FDA.  
Isolating One Explanatory Variable 
 Another difficulty for psychedelic research lies in the isolation of one explanatory variable. 
A variable is some factor which varies across individuals or situations (Shaughnessy,  2014). 
Researchers usually choose one variable which they manipulate (i.e. the independent variable). The 
effect is what the experimenter measures (i.e the dependent variable). Confounding variables are 
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variables which may provide an alternative explanation for the results. For example, when looking 
at whether or not breastfeeding causes children to have a high IQ, one must control for parental IQ, 
lest it be this variable, and not breastfeeding, which affects IQ (Der, Batty, & Deary, 2006). 
Experimenters must attempt to control for such variables, because in order to draw any causal 
explanations from an experiment, alternative explanations for changes in the participants need to be 
ruled out. It is also the case that the fewer independent variables the better, because when there are 
multiple, it can be challenging to tell which independent variable elicits change in the dependent 
variable.    
 The problem for psychedelic research is that it is difficult to isolate one, or even two 
independent variables. As you can see from my description of a psychedelic therapy session, there 
are always multiple factors involved which could arguably have caused the effect: psychedelic 
drugs are always concurrent with psychotherapy, the kind of music which is played has an 
important role, and the setting in which it takes place is also of vital importance. “Context 
stripping” is a massive problem for psychedelic research precisely because of the complex networks 
of interactions which are involved (Rucker et al., 2017; Sloshower, 2018). An experiment by Storm, 
Baker, and Solursh (1966) illustrates this exact point. In the 1960s, researchers were excited about 
psychedelics as a potential treatment for alcoholism, and the results were promising (Grinspoon & 
Bakalar, 1981). Storm et al. were dubious of the purported effects, and so conducted an experiment 
where they attempted to isolate the effects of the drug from all other variables. Participants were 
administered LSD in neutral rooms by clinicians who were instructed not to interact with them at all 
during the session, apart from to administer an extensive questionnaire. The volunteers were 
constrained, blindfolded, or both. Since many psychedelic researchers acknowledge that an 
appropriate environment and concurrent psychotherapy is integral to a beneficial experience with 
psychedelic drugs, it was not surprising to them that the results of the experiment failed to replicate 
the promising results that had been observed in previous experiments.    
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 This once again brings up issues with the FDA, since this body requires that it is the 
substance alone which is responsible for the therapeutic efficacy (Slowshower, 2018). This 
requirement does not allow for the investigation of complex interactions of factors such as music, 
dieting, praying, decor etc. In the current paradigm, these are all variables which either need to be 
eliminated, controlled for, or be seen as confounding variables. Reducing psychedelic therapy down 
to one variable is therefore not strictly possible, and this has the unfortunate consequence that 
clinical trial designs are not able to account for the complex mutual interactions between drug and 
non-drug variables in a psychedelic therapy session (ibid). Because these complex interactions are 
crucial aspects of psychedelic therapy, this leaves the researcher operating in the current paradigm 
in an awkward position. They either attempt to design an experiment with multiple independent 
variables, which may have implications for the perceived legitimacy of psychedelic research, or 
they simply use one independent variable (i.e the drug itself), which erases extremely important 
aspects of the psychedelic experience which are crucial to the success of the drug in treating 
disorders.   
Reductive Neurobiological-style Explanations 
 Mystical and spiritual dimension of psychedelic therapies can pose a problem due to the 
prevalence of reductive neurobiological-style explanations in contemporary psychiatry. When those 
who have taken part in psychedelic treatment trials are asked about their experiences, or why they 
feel better, they say things like “I felt like sunshine twinkling through leaves, I was nature.” (Watts 
et al., 2017, p.534), and “Then I felt the presence of God: I have always thought that he was a man 
because of the way I was raised, reading the bible, but it felt like a female energy” (ibid, p.535). 
Such statements are at odds with the kind of explanations which are accepted in the mainstream 
psychiatric paradigm, namely that psychiatric drugs operate on the neurochemical substrates of 
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mental disorders (Anderson, 2012; Moncrieff & Cohen, 2009).  Explanations of why others 
psychiatric drugs like selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) work look something like this:    
SSRIs block the reuptake of serotonin into the presynaptic nerve terminal via the serotonin 
uptake site, thus increasing the synaptic concentration of serotonin. This results in increased 
activation of the presynaptic inhibitory receptors and decreased firing of the serotonergic 
neurone. In the treatment of depression and panic anxiety, SSRIs exert their therapeutic 
effects by increasing the availability of serotonin in the synapse (Nutt et al., 1999, p.S85, 
emphasis added)   
Explanations of the effectiveness of psychedelic therapy, on the other hand, usually appeal to 
multiple different levels of explanation, not just neurobiological:  
It is proposed that psychedelics initiate a cascade of neurobiological changes that manifest at 
multiple scales and ultimately culminate in the relaxation of high-level beliefs. The purpose 
of psychedelic therapy is to harness the opportunity afforded by this belief-relaxation to 
achieve a healthy revision of pathological beliefs (Carhart-Harris, 2019, p.16).  
This explanation refers to both neurobiology, and the effect of the phenomenological experience 
occasioned by the drug on the mental states of the individual. This phenomenological ‘conversion’ 
experience is an important aspect of the mechanism of action of the drug (Anderson, 2012; Carhart-
Harris & Goodwin, 2017; Majić, Schmidt, & Gallinat, 2015; Pollan, 2018). Psychedelics are 
technically psychoactive drugs, like anti-depressants or anti-psychotics as they exert an effect on the 
chemical make-up of the brain. However, as can be seen from the above SSRI explanation, 
mechanisms of action of these kinds of mainstream psychiatric drugs typically do not refer to the 
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phenomenological experience of the individual, especially not spiritual aspects of that experience. 
Therefore, the very core of psychedelic therapy challenges the model of psychological interventions 
in use today (Hendy, 2018). While it is possible to describe psychedelic experiences solely in 
neurobiological terms, to do so would ignore a vitally important aspect of the treatment: the 
phenomenological consciousness-altering experience. I believe you could argue that a psychiatrist 
operating in the current paradigm could appeal to the phenomenological experience of the 
individual when describing mechanisms of action, the issue is more that they simply do not.  
 The reduction of the psychedelic experience to a neurobiological or chemical explanation 
both erases a vital aspect of the therapy, and delegitimises indigenous knowledge regarding 
psychedelic experiences (Corbin, 2012). Sloshower (2018) explains that psychedelics impact 
multiple levels of explanation (e.g. biological, psychological, social, spiritual, and energetic), and to 
attempt to reduce explanations of the mechanism of action of psychedelic drugs to just one level is 
inappropriate. However, Pollan (2018) succinctly notes that this is a problem for the psychedelic 
researcher because “it [psychedelic therapy] takes psychotherapy perilously close to shamanism and 
faith healing, a distinctly uncomfortable place for a scientist to be” (p.159). 
 The kinds of explanations permitted by the current psychiatric paradigm do not leave room 
for the mechanisms of action which emerge from psychedelic research (Anderson, 2012). It is also 
characteristic of psychedelic experiences that one cannot put them into words. This ineffability is 
problematic under the current paradigm – How could one attempt to objectively measure the 
phenomenological experience by answering a questionnaire, or explaining to an investigator when 
words fail you? Or when the words that you would like to say reference some kind of god, or higher 
power? How can you get the rest of the scientific community to take you seriously? This issue, 
coupled with the fact that the effectiveness of psychedelic drugs cannot be solely explained in 
neurobiological terms potentially has consequences for how psychedelic therapy research is 
perceived in the scientific community as a whole.    
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How Scientific Values Affect Psychedelic Research   
 It can been seen from the work of Kuhn and Longino that paradigmatic values have 
implications for which theories are thought of as ‘good’, which will in turn affect which theories are  
investigated. Some of Kuhn’s values are also arguably manifested in several of the paradigmatic 
standards described above. Isolating one explanatory variable maps roughly onto Kuhn’s value of 
simplicity, because it tries to bring order to previously confused phenomena. The prevalence of 
reductive neurobiological style explanations for mechanisms of action may be a manifestation of  
“consistency”. Laypersons prefer neuroscientific explanations, and perceive them as more 
legitimate, even when the neuroscience information included in the explanation is irrelevant 
(Fernandez-Duque, Evans, Christian, & Hodges, 2015; Weisberg, Hopkins, & Taylor, 2018). Given 
this, and the fact that most psychiatric mechanisms of action are written in this style, it makes sense 
that to be perceived as ‘good’, psychiatric explanations should be consistent with this reductive 
neurobiological style. By diverging from this style, the research runs the risk of being regarded as 
less legitimate.   
 Psychedelic therapy may not be a very good theory according to Kuhn’s values. It is not 
simple or consistent, and may not have breadth of scope. However, it embodies many, if not all of 
the values proposed by Longino. The value psychedelic therapy most clearly demonstrates is 
novelty. This value prioritises theories which differ significantly from accepted theories. The reason 
for this is that by postulating different processes and principles of explanation, or by investigating 
things which have not previously been investigated, we express a doubt that the current frameworks 
are adequate to deal with the problems which we face. Mental ill-health is a massive problem facing 
our global society (Kessler et al., 2009), and many people express doubts as to whether the current 
mental health care services available are adequate to deal with the problem at hand (Anderson, 
2012; Hogan, 2014; Patel et al., 2007; Slade, 2010). Essentially, if the established methods are not 
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working well, ‘novelty’ as a value dictates that we should think outside of the box and try 
something new. Although psychedelic medicines have been around for many years, their potential 
use in contemporary psychiatry is a relatively new hypothesis. Their use is very much at odds with 
the current psychiatric paradigm, for both methodological reasons which I have laid out in the 
previous section, and because of the socio-cultural baggage and misconceptions which come with 
the term ‘psychedelics’ (e.g. that they are abused recreationally, that they are precipitators of 
psychosis, that they are the pastime of unemployed ‘hippies’ etc.), not to mention their illegal status 
(Marks, 2018). Current psychiatric solutions are arguably not sufficient to solve the problem at 
hand. This, coupled with the fact that psychedelic therapy differs in significant ways from these 
solutions is, in, Longino’s view, a good thing.  
 The second relevant value is “complexity of interaction”. This value prioritises theories 
which treat the interactions between different entities as mutual and dynamic rather than 
unidirectional processes, and prioritises models in which there are multiple rather than single 
factors. Moving away from a single explanatory variable approach to a more holistic, multi-
directional approach would be much better for psychedelic research. If this value were prioritised, 
and ‘context stripping’ was not a requirement for clinical experiments, it would no longer be 
problematic that psychedelic therapy is intertwined with “set” and “setting”. According to 
Longino’s feminist values, the fact that psychedelic therapy involves mutual and dynamic 
interactions between multiple factors actually makes it a better theory.   
 Longino’s value of ontological heterogeneity is also relevant. An ontologically 
heterogeneous theory grants parity to different kinds of efficacious entities. A theory that is 
ontologically homogenous treats different entities as different versions of the same paradigmatic 
member of that domain, and assumes that differences between these kinds can be reduced to a 
single basic kind. It seems that in psychiatry, explanations of mechanisms of actions are  usually 
reduced to some kind of neurobiological or chemcical action, and as I mentioned above, these kinds 
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of explanations are perceived as more legitimate. Ontological heterogeneity would allow for the 
multiple levels of explanatory mechanisms in psychedelic therapy. By giving credence to all levels, 
it would allow scientific researchers to accept and grant parity to the mystical and spiritual aspects 
of psychedelic therapy, as well as the neurobiological, spiritual, energetic, and phenomenological 
levels of explanation. In an ontologically heterogeneous theory, primacy is not given to any one 
level over the other. In a more feminist paradigm, the fact that the explanation is not reducible to 
one single level is advantageous.   
 Psychedelic therapy is also applicable to current human needs, since it aims to alleviate the 
suffering that humans experience as a result of mental illness. It also arguably ‘diffuses power’ 
because psychedelic drugs can be found in nature, and it requires only a trained psychotherapist to 
administer the drugs, as well as a suitable environment for the session to take place. For these 
reasons I argue that if we were operating in a more feminist paradigm (according to Longino’s 
criteria), psychedelic therapy would be considered a “good” theory. If the FDA were to prioritise 
these values, the process of legalisation would arguably be easier, meaning that research would be 
easier to conduct in this area. If research were easier to conduct, there would be more studies, and 
the efficacy of the drugs would be easier to ascertain. Therefore psychedelic therapy would have a 
better chance at being accepted as a main-stream treatment.    
 Given all this, what would have to happen to the current paradigm in order for it to become 
more feminist according to Longino’s standards? Values are part of a paradigm, but it is debatable 
as to whether they are fundamental enough such that prioritising feminist values would result in a 
paradigm shift or expansion. Paradigm shifts are characterised by a change of scientific goals, 
change of the linguistic meaning of key scientific terms, as well as a change in the way that 
scientists perceive the world (Nickles, 2017). In this case, the goal of the two treatment strategies 
remains constant; to relieve the suffering of those with mental health problems. The key scientific 
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terms do not seem to change either, but one could argue that the way in which scientists perceive 
the world is different. One major characteristic of a paradigm shift is that theories from the two 
different paradigms are not commensurable or comparable, to such an extent that scientists 
operating in different paradigms are unable to communicate their ideas to each other, because they 
“work in different worlds” (Kuhn, 1962, p.13). To make such a claim about psychedelic therapy 
researchers and other psychiatric researchers seems to me to be too strong. It is not immediately 
obvious that psychedelic therapy and mainstream psychiatry (e.g use of SSRIs and anti-psychotics) 
are totally separate research avenues, and could not both be legitimate treatment strategies in their 
own right. An in-depth discussion of this is beyond the scope of my dissertation, so for the time-
being I will adopt a weak position, and claim that the points that I have argued above support at the 
very least, a paradigm expansion or modification i.e. by “adding” in feminist values. By simply 
“adding” feminist values to the mix, we do end up with a rather large set of values, many of which 
contradict each other. However as Kuhn noted, several of his values (such as simplicity and breadth 
of scope) contradict each other. This is not an issue because it is up to the scientist which values 
they choose the prioritise. The new set of values would be large, ungainly, and contradictory, but 
that is not to say that it would be wrong. Unless we had simplicity as some kind of meta-value, then 
it should not be a problem.  
Objections 
 I suspect that the main objection to my argument will be that DB-RCTs, isolating a single 
explanatory variable, and neurobiological reductive-style explanations are integral in assuring the 
safety of a drug, and cannot simply be disregarded because they promote ‘problematic’ values. If 
psychedelic therapy cannot meet these standards, then it should not, by default, become a 
mainstream treatment. While I am sympathetic to such a suggestion, my point is not that we should 
do away with such techniques. Undeniably, there are experimental situations where DB-RCTs, or 
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isolating a single variable are necessary. Rather, I argue that we should expand the current paradigm 
to include different efficacy and safety-testing methods, thus making it easier for alternative 
solutions to reach the standards of regulatory bodies. As I shall outline in the next section, there are 
viable alternatives to the methodological techniques and explanatory styles which I have described 
above.  
 There is controversy surrounding the of the use of placebo-controlled trials in psychiatry 
out-with the context of psychedelic drugs (Lyons, 1999). Even Louis Lasagna, one of those who 
pioneered the development of the double-blind trial in clinical research has admitted that the 
importance of DB-RCTs may have been over-emphasised:   
We have witnessed the ascendancy of the randomized, double-blind, controlled clinical trial, 
to the point where many in positions of authority now believe that data obtained via this 
technique should constitute the only basis for registering a drug or indeed for coming to any 
conclusions about its efficacy at any time in the drug's career. My thesis is that this 
viewpoint is untenable, needlessly rigid, unrealistic, and at times unethical... (Lasagna, 
1985, p.48)  
He cautions against the idea that DB-RCTs should be the only experimental standard for testing the 
safety of a drug. An effective placebo is essential for a double blind trial - If people can reliably 
guess which treatment condition they have been assigned to, then it is not a blinded trial. Since this 
is often the case with psychedelics, effective blinding is not really a possibility. Montgomery (1999) 
admits that DB-RCTs are the best way of testing the efficacy of a drug, but as an alternative in 
certain cases, one could simply test that the results are superior to some established treatment which 
is consistently superior than placebo, and is a suitable equivalent to the drug being tested. This is 
called a reference-controlled study. Participants would not be blinded to their condition, so it would 
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have to be an open-label reference-controlled study. Without blinding the trial, results will likely be 
“better” than had it not been blinded, because of the placebo effect (Chaplin, 2006). For this reason, 
its prudent that there should be a relatively high number high quality open-label reference-
controlled studies which show psychedelic therapy to be equivalently effective or more effective 
than other established treatments in order to reliably establish the efficacy of psychedelic therapy. 
 As for the problem of isolating one explanatory variable, the most sensible solution would 
be to keep all factors of “set” and “setting” constant, which is the approach taken by Carhart-Harris 
et al. (2016b) in their open-label feasibility trial investigating the effectiveness of using psilocybin 
to treat depression. A possible consequence of this may be that instead of saying, for example, 
“psilocybin is an an effective treatment for X”, one would have to say “psilocybin therapy is an 
effective treatment for X”, where psilocybin therapy refers to the whole package of psychotherapy, 
drug administration, music, décor etc. Such a move would require the FDA to embrace the value of 
‘complexity of interaction’, and introduce some procedure for approving drugs which are 
necessarily concurrent with “set” and “setting”.  
 The mystical and spiritual aspects of psychedelic therapy may be made more acceptable by 
addressing the ontology of scientists, rather than by altering the style of explanation given for the 
outcomes of psychedelic research. By prioritising Longino's value of ontological heterogeneity, 
experimental psychiatrists would take a more anthropological approach by noting the importance of 
being ontologically open-minded. Instead of looking to reduce the phenomenological experience of 
the individual down to neurobiological or chemical processes, it is important to recognise that this 
experience still has important explanatory power in and of itself, even if it is not measurable or 
observable by outside techniques. By prioritising measurable reductive explanations, some 
explanatory power is lost, since the content of the “consciousness altering” phenomenological 
experience is usually linked to issues which are causing the individual’s struggles, and those who 
take part in psychedelic therapy tend to cite this phenomenological experience as the most crucial to 
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their improvement (Majić, Schmidt, & Gallinat, 2015). Although it may be a stretch to say that one 
should accept these experiences as literally real, it is feasible to recognise that they are real to the 
individual, and that treating this experience as some kind of explanatory metaphor erases an 
important dimension of the therapeutic experience. A comprehensive account of the mechanism of 
action of psychedelic therapy would grant parity to all of the levels of explanation, including any 
spiritual or mystical elements which may arise. Any account of psychedelic therapy which ignores 
or dismisses these things not a comprehensive account of the mechanism of action of psychedelic 
therapy, and risks delegitimising indigenous knowledge by projecting our own western-educated-
industrialised-rich-democratic ontology onto traditional practices (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010). If scientists granted parity to different ontologies, the mystical and spiritual aspects of 
psychedelic therapy would not be a problem for psychedelic research. 
 Although psychedelic therapy does not fit in with many paradigmatic experimental 
techniques or explanatory styles, that is not to say that it is not effective, or that there are not 
suitable alternative methods of testing efficacy. By expanding our paradigm to include Longino’s 
values, this may provide flexibility in the kinds of methods which are used in the drug approval 
process, and therefore increase the possibility of psychedelic therapy becoming a mainstream 
treatment method.  
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have discussed the scientific values proposed by both Kuhn and 
Longino, and then by looking at the case study of psychedelic therapy, I have shown how these sets 
of values would either help or hinder research in this area. I conclude that Kuhn’s values are 
arguably manifested is several paradigmatic experimental standards, standards with which 
psychedelic therapy is incompatible. This renders research in this area incredibly difficult to do in 
the current paradigm. The fact that psychedelic therapy disadvantaged in this way is not to say that 
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it is not effective, and that research is not worthwhile. In fact research up until this point is 
promising. By prioritising feminist values which allow us to accept differing ontologies, complex 
webs of interaction, and novel theories, psychedelic therapy would be far more amenable to 
experimental research because it would no longer be inherently at odds with the values of the 
psychiatric paradigm. 
 Although the research suggests that psychedelic therapy could be an effective and widely 
used treatment, I do not wish to argue that a more feminist paradigm would automatically mean that 
psychedelic therapy would become mainstream. Rather, my conclusion is that if science were more 
feminist according to Longino’s standards, this would create a framework in which psychedelic 
therapy is given equal opportunity to become a mainstream treatment. Essentially, experimental 
research would not be hindered or disadvantaged by the inherent nature of the therapy itself. The 
characteristics which make psychedelic therapy incompatible with experimental research in the 
current paradigm would not be an issue in a more feminist paradigm; in fact, they would become its 
strengths. Since many of the legislative, methodological, and ontological issues which hinder 
psychedelic therapy research in the current paradigm would be removed or altered in order to reflect 
this change in values, plenty of thoroughly and carefully designed research trials of psychedelic 
therapy could take place. Without these barriers, psychedelic therapy would have a better chance of 
meeting the standards set out by regulatory bodies, and therefore be more likely to become a 
mainstream treatment than in the current paradigm. Of course, in this dissertation I only examine 
how a feminist paradigm would help psychedelic research. Who is to say how many other research 
avenues would open up if our scientific paradigm were more feminist? 
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